As a sad example of suspicion arising from current e-voting systems, I'd like you to read a story that I don't really know how to believe -- which is my point.

The Raw Story reports on new news about Georgia's 2002 election irregularities, with a tale of illegal tampering with voting machines just before the election, and suspiciously unexpected election results. Now, it may well be that that Diebold's then-CEO, Bob Urosevich, personally travelled to Georgia to see to the software patching of some voting machines. It may even be that the patches were only applied in the two counties that are claimed as mainly Democratic in voting history. But I do have some trouble believing, however, that the patches were intend to inaccurately record votes in order to tip the election to Republican candidates for Senator and Governor. 

There's two real problems here. First, we'll never know what really happened inside those computers 6 years ago. But more importantly, any such suspicions -- now or in the future -- can never be disproved, because its impossible to know what these closed, proprietary, black-box systems really do.

As long as such black-box systems are in use, conspiracy suspicions will continue to sap confidence our elections. That confidence is a most previous item, and that's why we thing open systems and crystal box voting are required for public confidence. 

-- EJS

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